

and political reforms in the DPRK are the most rational. We have to normalize and develop Soviet–North Korean links on a pragmatic basis, drawing Pyongyang in to discuss the variety of regional economic, ecological, and political problems. The aim of such an approach is to make easier a gradual transition of the DPRK to compromise and civilize forms of international intercourse.

Pragmatism screened by *Jucheization*, double thinking, intolerance toward those who are not like-minded, democracy, and pluralism put the DPRK out of the civilized process of developing the world and make any dialogue with this country difficult. Nonetheless, there is no other way but a dialogue with Pyongyang. Multilateral contracts between scientists, politicians, and businessmen to discuss the Korean situation and to coordinate countries' efforts to draw the former "outpost of socialism" in the Far East into a constructive exchange of opinions and in the cooperation are of great importance. In essence, only a political and ideological world climate of this kind, which in the end the North Korean closed society must accept, will be able to drive the country to change. If we can open, even if only slightly, the country and show it the advantages of a civilized life, progress will be made.

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# 7

## THE POWER BASE OF KIM JONG IL: FOCUSING ON ITS FORMATION PROCESS

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## INTRODUCTION

The death of The leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Chairman Kim Il Sung, has posed the most critical political issue for North Korea, that is, how successful a transfer of power to Kim Il Sung's political successor and son, the Party's General Secretary Kim Jong Il, can we expect? Given the significance of North Korea in regional and global political concerns, this issue has naturally drawn most attention from abroad.

In order to determine the answer to this question, it is important for us to examine a variety of domestic and international conditions. Included in these must be Kim Jong Il's character and ability, his present power base, the situation of politics and ideology, the situation of the society and the economy, which are the basis for politics and ideology, and the international environment surrounding North Korea. This research will focus on a structural and historical examination of Kim Jong Il's power base. Most work on North Korea's political power has so far focused on the aspect of human relations among the significant individuals comprising the highest political leadership. In examining Kim Il Jong's power base such a focus does carry certain effectiveness and significance, but it has often encountered serious difficulty due to lack of information. In order to cope with the difficulty and to prepare a framework for our analysis, I shall try to explicate structural characteristics of his power base through examination of its functional aspects, or more specifically, processes of Kim Jong Il's leadership formation in different divisions where those functions are performed.

An answer to the question of Kim Jong Il's power base cannot be provided without answering one of the core questions in political science: "What is power?" In this research, I shall employ a rather conventional model of power. E.H. Carr indicates military power, economic power, and the power to control public opinion as three functions of political power in the international arena.<sup>1</sup> Toffler, in his recent work, named violence, wealth, and knowledge as basic powers to control a society.<sup>2</sup> Although these definitions were given in the context of international politics, they are thought basically valid in the context of domestic politics. Keeping those three components of power in mind, I define a person's power base as a part of an organization performing one of those functions over which he establishes his leadership or as a particular group of members of an organization over whom his power is established.

What organizations can be named as those capable of exercising those components of power in North Korea today? Major organizations can be grouped under the three components as follows:

1. *Military power*: National Defense Committee, People's Arms Department, People's Army of Korea, People's Guards, Soviet Red Army, Department of Social Safety, Public Prosecutor's Office, Law-Abiding Life Guidance Committee, National Security Department, and so on;
2. *Economic Power*: Party's departments in charge of economic affairs, Parliament's departments and committees in charge of economic affairs, local administrative and economic guidance committees of every level and their secretariats, industry cooperative associations, banks, Party's committee of each production site, Three Great Revolutions Teams, and so on;
3. *Power to Control Public Opinion and Ideology*: Party's Department of Campaign, Parliament's Department of Culture and Arts, Education Boards and schools at every level, research institutes, Artist Union, publishing companies, broadcasting organs, theatrical companies, producers' group, and so on.

Hereinafter I shall refer to these organizations by the divisions of power to which they belong: the division of military affairs, the division of economic affairs, and the division of ideology. This research will discuss how strong Kim Jong Il's leadership is in these three divisions.

Obviously, one's leadership in a certain organization can never be established simply by acquiring an institutional position. In order for him to have leadership, in addition to the institutional position there are various necessary conditions such as close connections with executive members of the organizations, strengthening of authority over all the members of the organizations concerned, and accumulation of positive achievements in exercising influential power over the organizations concerned.

In Japan, we have not yet had any notable work in examining the real condition of Kim Jong Il's leadership in these three divisions.<sup>3</sup> As a result, his leadership in them has often been misunderstood as nothing more than power inherited by virtue of being the son of Kim Il Sung, or as a result of his ideas being forced onto the political agenda through the pressure of Three Great Revolutions' teams, consisting of students with no administrative experience and unconstrained by law.<sup>4</sup> These misunderstandings have caused the omission of the examination of his leadership. This research will correct the existent, misperceived image of Kim Jong Il's power base by

focusing on the conditions required to establish his leadership and presenting an examination of the process of his leadership formation in the three divisions.

### LEADERSHIP IN THE DIVISION OF IDEOLOGY

Upon his graduation from Kim Il Sung University, Kim Jong Il began to work for the Party's Central Committee in April 1964. Within a mere eight months, using Kim Il Sung's authoritative influence, he strengthened his influence over the division of movie making. Using his own influence, he held an enlarged conference of the Political Committee of the Party's Central Committee with the presence of Kim Il Sung at the Korea Theatrical Movie Studio on December 8, 1964. (The contents of the conference have been kept secret.) In the background of this conference, there were two significant events held in advance: Kim Jong Il visited the studio on November 8 of the same year to deliver Kim Il Sung's speech, "On the Creation of Revolutionary Literature and Arts," which was delivered two days before; and he visited the studio again on December 7 to check the condition of the preparation for Kim Il Sung's visit.<sup>5</sup> The decision to hold this conference was made by Kim Il Sung after he had received a report on the real conditions of movie arts in the country. At the conference Chairman Kim delivered a speech entitled "Let's Create Many More Revolutionary Movies Contributing to Revolutionary Education and Class Education." This meaningful conference of the political committee was thought to be the starting point for Kim Jong Il's active involvement in the division of movie arts with his energetic and impressive leadership.<sup>6</sup> However, this event was nothing more than a prologue in the process of Kim Jong Il's leadership formation in the division of ideology.

Kim Jong Il started to actively influence the division of the campaign using the purge of Kapsanpa at the Party's Central Committee's Fourth Term Fifteenth General Assembly as momentum. This can be confirmed in the following statement found in a North Korean Document:

The Glorious Center of the Party (meaning Kim Jong Il) strengthened our cultural project in order to drastically establish the one and only ideology system of the Party by rendering all the Party members to correctly recognize the crimes which were committed by anti-Party, anti-revolutionary elements and exposed at the Party's Central Committee's Fourth Term Fifteenth General Assembly, and by firmly equipping the Party members with the revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader.<sup>7</sup>

At that time, the Korean Workers' Party, in order to arrange the study system for its executive members, took steps such as the implementation of Wednesday lecture meetings, Sunday study meetings, and daily two-hour study and the establishment of the "One-Month Study Center" aiming at a one-month-a-year study system both in central and local areas (in which several hundreds of thousands of executive members participated every year). Of these the first step was thought to be brought into effect under Kim Jong Il's initiative.<sup>8</sup>

At that time, however, Kim Jong Il concentrated his effort in the division of ideology to the promotion of the "Revolutionary Tradition Education Project" described as follows:

The Glorious Center of the Party has made it possible to promote revolutionary tradition education by carefully maintaining "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Revolution Evidence Museum" and "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Revolution Ideology Research Center" which were bases of the Party's one and only ideological education and also known as the old battle division of the revolution war and the evidence of the revolution respectively.<sup>9</sup>

In addition Kim Jong Il ordered the compilation of "The Pictorial Record of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Revolution History Research Center," prepared Kim Il Sung's handwritten manuscripts to be used in the record in March 1966 and ordered the production of a Kim Il Sung's statue which was to be placed in the research center.<sup>10</sup>

### Maintenance of Historic Sites

In June 1967 in Haesan, Kim Jong Il built the Memorial Tower of the Victory in the Battle of Bochunbo celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the victory.<sup>11</sup> The celebration on June 4 was attended by 50,000 people including executive members who were anti-Japan partisans.<sup>12</sup> In June 1972 Kim Jong Il took leadership in organizing the thirty-fifth anniversary of the victory at the same location. At that time, several ceremonies took place including a ceremony celebrating the erection of a memorial tower, a People's Army and Mass Demonstration, and a celebration banquet. A number of significant military and government officials attended each of these and at the celebration banquet, Oh Jin Wu, the Chief of the General Staff, delivered a speech.<sup>13</sup>

It is said that Kim Jong Il also ordered the careful display of documents and evidence when the Hon Won Museum of Revolution and the L Won Museum of Revolution were built in September and October 1967 to commemorate his uncle Kim Hyong Kwan's achievement in the revolution.

tion.<sup>14</sup> In addition to these acts, Kim Jong Il is said to have had some influence when a bronze statue of his grandfather was built in 1968.<sup>15</sup>

In another strong symbolic gesture, it is said that in July 1968 he, together with a female anti-Japan revolution fighter, inspected the old battle field of the revolutionary war in Yangkang-do to create its maintenance plan and to initiate the project of "A Thousand Mile Road of Exploration March."<sup>16</sup>

### Emphasis on "Revolutionary Tradition" in the Division of Culture and Arts

In order to embody the image of Chairman Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il organized special creative artists' groups such as the Pakdusan Creation Group, the April 15 Literature Creation Group, and the Mansudae Creation Group with eminent creative artists.<sup>17</sup> It is believed that all of these groups were created in the late 1960s. For example, the Mansudae Creative Group, which is said to have made the opera *The Flower Selling Girl*, was established in 1969.<sup>18</sup> This development tells us that Kim Jong Il promoted a grand scale reform of the organizations of culture and arts around that time.

Kim Jong Il also aggressively promoted the enhancement of the authority of Kim Il Sung in the division of movie making. First, although the year is not known, he severely criticized the Art General Conference which had been held annually in the division of movie making and ordered that it be changed to the Research Meeting of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Ideology on Literature and Arts.<sup>19</sup> This research meeting is thought to have become a prototype of the "Party's Life Total System" that later prevailed among all Party members.

After promoting a change of the general atmosphere of the movie world as stated above, Kim Jong Il proposed to make a movie out of the theatrical drama *The Sea of Blood*, which is said to have been written by Kim Il Sung during the war against Japan, as the first step for the start of revolutionary tradition in the movies. He completed the movie in early September 1969.<sup>20</sup> Following that, he arranged to make a movie based on another drama by Kim Il Sung, *Destiny of a Member of the Self-Defense Group*, written during the war against Japan. In making the movie, Kim Jong Il visited the movie location by helicopter with the directing staff in February 1970, and proposed "speed-up tactics," thanks to which the movie was completed within forty days.<sup>21</sup> Reflecting upon the successfully rapid movie making, Kim Jong Il asserted at the Strategic General Session, the necessity of applying the speed-up tactics to other movies and thus made dozens of movies in 1970.<sup>22</sup>

During those days, there were many other examples of his directing movie making. One episode is that when Kim Il Sung highly evaluated a

new movie *The Working Place of Wife*, on May 23, 1970, Kim Jong Il rushed a five-hour driving distance to tell the production group about the evaluation in person.<sup>23</sup> Judging from the date, it may be considered that Kim Jong Il started those activities right after Kim Il Sung's speech delivered to movie makers on November 1, 1968, entitled "A Few Problems Concerning Revolutionary Movie Making," in which he indicated problems in movie making in view of revolutionary tradition and ordered its improvement.

Another activity in which Kim Jong Il was involved during the 1960s was the leadership of the Mobile Youth Campaign Force. Responding to Kim Il Sung's statement in the Second National Youth Mobile Campaign Force General Performance Contest, "Let's broadly develop the activities of the Youth Mobile Campaign Force, and powerfully recall the importance of accomplishing Party's Policies," Kim Jong Il powerfully reminded the general public of the importance of accomplishing Party policies by coordinating and organizing the guidance system of the activities of the mobile campaign forces in each division including the Youth Mobile Campaign Force.<sup>24</sup>

During the 1970s, Kim Jong Il maintained his leadership in the division of arts and drove home the idea of revolutionary tradition. For example, in February 1971, he gave intensive instructions to the division of movie making. In other words, he reported "Some Problems in Movie Making" on February 12, and "On Bringing a New Enhancement in Movie Making" on February 15.<sup>25</sup> In the latter report he asserted, "We have to solve all the problems posed in the movie making by setting the Great Leader's *Juche* ideology in literature and the Party's ideology in literature as the one and only standard."<sup>26</sup> Then Kim Jong Il is said to have established a new production management system, based on a scientific analysis of the reality in movie making in literature, and to have created the producer's committee in the Film and Movie Literature Production Company and the Literature and Arts Commission, aiming at promoting the level of political practice and production ability of writers.<sup>27</sup>

As to the division of opera, he felt the necessity of reforming opera by watching an old fashioned opera titled *Under the Sunlight*, in the late 1960s. He worked on the opera revolution through making an opera out of *The Sea of Blood* in whose production process at Pyongyang Great Theater in July 1970 he was directly involved. The opera's premiere performance was on July 15 with the presence of Kim Il Sung.<sup>28</sup> Within the following couple of years, he produced several original revolution operas such as *A Real Daughter of the Party*, *Jungles*, *Speak Up*, and *Song of the Diamond Mountains*, and made a revolution opera based on some literature such as *A Flower Selling Girl*, and *Destiny of a Member of the Self-Defense Group*.<sup>29</sup> Kim Jong Il also showed his leadership in the division of theatrical drama by making a revolution drama titled *Song of the Red Dang* when he visited the National Theatrical Drama Association in November 1972. In addition, Kim Jong Il had numerous other public appearances and presented a great number of additional speeches during the late 1960s and early 1970s, each relating to the significance of art in the revolutionary

## Strengthening Leadership between 1973 and 1974

As is generally known, between 1973 and 1974 the opposition to Kim Jong Il in the Party increased dramatically. Concretely speaking, Kim Jong Il was selected the secretary in charge of organization and campaign at the Party's Central Committee's Fifth Term Seventh Conference held from September 4 through 17, 1974, and was elected a member of the Political Committee in the Fifth Term Eighth Conference held from February 11 to 13 in 1974. In the Eighth Conference, it is reported that despite the fact that the issue of selecting a Political Committee member was not on the original agenda of the conference, a senior executive member who was a faithful follower of Kim Il Sung since the war against Japan recommended Kim Jong Il as a member of the Party's Central Committee's Political Committee.<sup>30</sup> It is said that the senior executive might have been Vice Prime Minister Kim Il.<sup>31</sup>

While working as the Secretary in charge of organization and ideology, Kim Jong Il succeeded in establishing his leadership. Furthermore, as soon as he was selected as a Political Committee member, he started exercising his influence over the division of ideology with more boldness and energy. One such influence was observed in his proposal for the policy of "the whole society thoroughly under Kim-Il-Sung-ism." On February 19, 1974, at the Lecture Class for the National Party's Campaign Relations Activists, he delivered a speech titled "Some Pressing Problems in the Party's Ideology Education Activity Aiming at the Permeation of Kim-Il-Sung-ism through the Whole Society" and insisted on (1) exhaustive education of the one and only ideology, revolution, and class; (2) promotion of the ideological dispute; (3) development of the economic campaign, and (4) improvement of the Party's operation system. Then Kim Jong Il presented a talk entitled "Some Possible Problems in Understanding *Juche* Philosophy" to activists specializing in the campaign on April 2, and published two essays titled "Let's More Firmly Establish the System of the One and Only Ideology in the Whole Party and the Whole Society," and "Our Party's Media and Publications Are the Powerful Ideological Weapons Contributing to the Permeation of Kim-Il-Sung-ism through the Whole Society," on April 14 and May 7 respectively. The Lecture Class for the Party's campaign activists as well as those for the organization's executive members is thought to have been organized and developed by the Party's Center.<sup>32</sup> In addition, in July and August he directed a Lecture Class for the National Party's Executive Members for several days with almost no sleep.<sup>33</sup> At the conclusion of the class on August 2, he delivered a speech titled "Let's Powerfully Promote the Movement to Hold the Whole Society under Kim-Il-Sung-ism by Improving and Strengthening the Party's Activities Fundamentally." It is said that Kim Il Sung sent the Lecture Class a note titled "On Further Strengthening Party's

Activities" which taught the class about establishing strong organizational disciplines for the whole party to work only under the leadership of the Party's Center.<sup>34</sup> Later, on October 2, 1976, Kim Jong Il publicized an informal talk with the Party's campaign activists titled, "To Understand the Uniqueness of Kim-Il-Sung-ism."

It is thought that Kim Jong Il strengthened his leadership in the division of publishing and broadcasting using his inauguration as a Political Committee member as momentum. A North Korean document stated: "In 1974, as to the activities in publishing and broadcasting, the fire of the newspaper revolution, broadcast revolution and publication revolution gained headway under the energetic leadership of the Party's Center."<sup>35</sup> This movement started at the Fifth Term Eighth General Assembly in the form of the editorial revolution in the *Rodong sinmun*. Every day from February 14 to 22, the Labor newspaper serialized editorials concerning methods to implement decisions made in the Assembly. This editorial revolution in the *Rodong sinmun* was regarded as a model for a newspaper revolution which boldly destroyed old frameworks in the field of publishing and broadcasting.<sup>36</sup>

After inauguration as a Political Committee member, Kim Jong Il worked again on the reinforcement of the activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung's Revolution Ideology Research Center Network which he, himself, created in all parts of the country in the 1960s. Kim Jong Il promoted the establishment of the only ideological system, a system which faithfully reflects the loyalty toward the Great Leader by using a national network of research centers whose pinnacle is the Korean Revolution Museum built in Pyongyang in April 1972. As a result, all unhealthy elements like localism and familyism were overcome.<sup>37</sup>

## The Present Condition of His Leadership

As stated above, the Fourth Term Fifteenth Central Committee Assembly in May 1967 was a turning point in Kim Jong Il's leadership in the division of ideology. The major steps in that process were the reform of Comrade Kim Il Sung's revolution History Research Center Network, the maintenance of the revolutionary war's battlefields and artifacts, and the establishment of consistency in the expression of "revolutionary tradition" in the division of arts, especially in that of movie making. These steps were targeted at powerful development of deification of Kim Il Sung based on his achievements in the struggle against Japan. Furthermore, Kim Jong Il vitalized the activities in the division of ideology by focusing on "the permeation of Kim-Il-Sung-ism" as soon as he was given the position of Political Committee member. Using such activities as leverage, he was able to take almost full control of the division of campaign.

Since then there have been many instances concerning Kim Jong Il's leadership in the division of ideology. As to the aspect of ideology, there is no doubt that his achievement in enriching and formalizing *Juche* has already been officially recognized. It should be noted here, in addition, that in the fall of 1990 members of the Korean Central News Service and Changjak Sa Korean Literature, organizations belonging to the division of ideology, proposed a movement to praise Kim Jong Il which adopted a new style of sending letters of oath to him. If we recall that changes in North Korean Society have often been started in the division of ideology, the future development of this movement is worthy of special attention.

### LEADERSHIP IN THE DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Although Kim Jong Il has never assumed a leading official position in the economic sector, his role in policy making on economic affairs is crucial. In this section, I offer a very brief examination of the process of Kim Jong Il's power formation in the economic area since 1973 when he assumed the secretarial position in charge of propaganda in the Korea Workers' Party.

#### The Formation of Leadership

The "Small Team Campaign" (*sojo undong*) for Three Revolutions was officially created by Kim Il Sung in February 1973. In the fall of 1972, Kim Il Sung decided to organize and dispatch young cadres to light industrial production sites for guidance and leadership. In the following spring, the practice was expanded to all other areas of Three Revolutions with the epoch-making speech "Thought, Technology, and Culture for the Industrial Sector." Immediately after that, Kim Il Sung delivered another speech spelling out the same three principles for the Agricultural sector. In this way, the grassroots campaign penetrated into the economic life of the entire people of the country. The "Small Team Campaign" was designed to mobilize and dispatch a group of twenty to thirty youthful workers for the average-sized factory and up to fifty for larger enterprises.

Although there is evidence that Kim Jong Il was involved in these campaigns, it was not until 1975 that he was involved deeply in them when he spearheaded integrating campaigns by separate sectors into a centralized movement. Kim Jong Il was not only responsible for reorganizing the campaign but initiated educational programs for the Small Team members by requiring them to attend a variety of meetings and conferences within the government and Korean Workers' Party. In several major speeches during

1976, Kim Jong Il made the observation that members of the Small Teams were inadequately prepared for ideological and technical requirements for carrying out Three Revolutions and often instructed them to participate in educational programs. In this way, he exercised influence in decision-making processes of both the industrial and agricultural sectors.

Through the cadres assigned by the Party Center, Kim Jong Il pursued a pervasive leadership position. At first, he had to combat government bureaucrats and Party administrators but gradually his Small Teams were able to pave the way to institutionalization of all programs under the banners of Production Expansion and Technological Reforms. Throughout these efforts, Kim Jong Il made personal interaction with members of the Small Teams, personally handing out membership certificates and praising their contribution to the Three Revolutions campaign. In doing this, he was able to develop a "personal army" of sorts with active people who are dedicated to him. The number of members of Small Teams reached 170,000 of whom 20,000 earned membership of the Party. Kim Jong Il's leadership influence was not limited to the members of the teams; the members themselves, being leading figures in their workplaces, had a significant role in solidifying Kim's leadership at the grassroots level.

Kim Jong Il's influence in the economic sector did not begin with the Small Team campaign. In fact, even prior to that, he exercised a significant role as the framer and founder of the campaign known as "The Speedy War." When he was elected as a member of the Political Committee of the Korean Workers' Party's Central Committee in February 1974, he proclaimed "a new revolutionary principle of a 'Speedy War' which has provided the impetus for a nationwide movement under the same banner since then." Although the concept of "Speedy War" was originally designed to facilitate economic productivity, the campaign was developed as a comprehensive political and ideological, as well as economic, movement. The concept was presented as the realization of *Juche* ideology in a most comprehensive sense. In short, the leadership of Kim Jong Il in general economic policies and practices has been quite significant and effective and this leadership has carried over to other facets of his leadership.

### LEADERSHIP IN THE DIVISION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

#### Process of Leadership Formation

It is thought that Kim Jong Il already had a certain influence over the division when he mobilized the army for the parade on the Battle of Bocheon memorial day in June 1972. It was in 1973 and 1974, however, when public

documents started suggesting the existence of such influence. First, in October 1973 right after his inauguration as the Party's secretary, the Korean People's Army Commanders and Political Activists Conference was held gathering 20,000 army leaders. In the conference, Kim Il Sung presented a guideline for the struggle to further strengthen the People's Army, followed by O Jin U's report focusing on the reinforcement of all army units with Comrade Kim Il Sung's great revolutionary ideology and the Party's army policies. In response, in a discussion session, participants stressed the significance of promoting three great revolutions within the army, especially that of advancing an ideology revolution more than anything else.<sup>38</sup> This conference, judging from when it occurred and its contents, is considered to have been the most significant turning point for Kim Jong Il to strengthen his influence over the army. However, in the official conference report, we cannot sense the presence of Kim Jong Il. In addition, reports or comments on the Korean People's Army Establishment Memorial Day on February 8, 1974, did not mention "the Party's Center," a reference to Kim Jong Il.

It was on the Korean People's Revolutionary Army Establishment Memorial Day on April 25, 1974, right after Kim Jong Il's promotion to a Political Committee member, when the phrase of "the Party's Center" began to be used officially concerning the division of military affairs. The Party's newspaper, the *Rodong sinmun*, published an editorial titled "Beyond Generations Let's Gloriously Succeed and Develop the Flourishing Revolutionary Tradition Achieved by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung." The editorials called for loyalty toward Kim Il Sung by using the term "the Party's Center" as in "All the Party's organizations and activists must complete the great work of revolution beyond generations by praising the program of the Party's Center to color the whole society with Comrade Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideology," and "On the roads to complete the Great Leader's teachings and the Party's Center's program, it is honorable regardless of living or dying."

Other signals of Kim Jong Il's rise can be noted. For example, on April 24, Kim Il Sung, together with the executive members of the Party's government, observed the revolutionary opera "Destiny of a Member of Self-Defense Group" which, as stated before, was produced under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. At the Glorious Korean People's Revolutionary Army's Establishment Forty-Second Memorial Central Lecture Meeting held on the same day, it was reported that all the participants of the meeting firmly decided to promote great construction of socialism like a lightning under the revolutionary flag of 'the speed-up tactics' proposed by the Party's Center." This kind of meeting was held at many places, such as every province, city, county, organization, office, collective farm, and unit of the Korean People's Army and Korean People's Guards.<sup>39</sup>

In 1975, such a trend became stronger. At the Twenty-Seventh Anniversary of the Establishment of the Korean People's Army on February 7, the Chief of General Staff, General Oh Jin Wu asserted in his report, "We,

the people who are forever loyal to the Great Leader and the Party's Center, must show the whole country again our heroic spirit and inexhaustible creative power," and "We must drastically establish revolutionary spirit to produce, learn and live completely in the Anti-Japan partisan manner which the Party's Center proposed. In the February issue of *Kunroja Workers Magazine*, Lee Young Mu emphasized the necessity of holding up the policy of the permeation of *Juche* ideology through the whole society and the revolutionary policy of "speed-up tactics" presented by the Party's Center.<sup>40</sup>

In addition, in the October issue of *Kulloja*, O Jin U, So Chol, and Han Ik Su presented their papers in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the Party, in which each of them called for subjugation to Kim Jong Il by using the expressions "the Party's Center" or "the Party's revolutionary leadership." O Jin U emphasized the penetration of Kim Jong Il's Leadership by stating, "we have to develop an unyielding and fierce struggle against any small phenomena or elements which oppose the Party's revolutionary leadership, by unconditionally receiving and thoroughly achieving all the policies proposed by the Party's Center in which he most accurately embodied the revolutionary ideology and intention of the Great Leader."<sup>41</sup>

Positive acceptance of the leadership of Kim Jong Il, however, was not necessarily shared by all the army leaders at that time. Public documents from 1975 through 1978, especially those around 1977, show that the army leaders tried to avoid direct reference to Kim Jong Il's leadership over the army. Of course, today we can hardly know how such changes in expression were relevant to the degree of army leaders' practical support for Kim Jong Il.

In any event, the leadership of Kim Jong Il over the army during this period was strengthened from the bottom through the movement of The Three Revolutions started in the end of 1975. It can be argued that Kim Jong Il increased his direct tie with the bottom ranks of the army by developing and leading this movement in the army. Several documents support this argument. The *Rodong sinmun* of February 9, 1976, reported that on February 7, memorial briefing sessions on the anniversary of the establishment of the army were held in all the units of the Korean People's Army and the Korean People's Guards. The article said, "In the briefing session of Comrade Choi Eung Chung's unit of the Korean People's Army, the reporter gave the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and the Party's Center the highest honor and appreciation with ever-lasting loyalty, and declared to prepare themselves as bodyguards, suicide corps, or storming corps, to protect, even at the risk of their lives, the political ideology of the Great Leader and the Party's Center." The article also reported that the briefing session of Comrade Kim Young Su's unit of the Korean People's Army declared their resolution to struggle to serve the Great Leader and the Party's Center by dedicating their youthful time and energy and their lives.

The intermittent development of the movement of The Three Revolutions in the army, together with Kim Jong Il's movement toward the estab-

lishment of his leadership, was indicated in a paper in the November 1976 issue of *Kulloja* which called for the promotion of the movement and emphasized the necessity of thoroughly establishing strong revolutionary disciplines which breathe and move as one by following the Great Leader and the Party's Center.

In view of the establishment of Kim Jong Il's leadership over the army concerning the movement of The Three Revolutions, it is significant to note that the movement provided him with a turning point to directly influence the bottom stratum of the army through the political organ in the army and that it emphasized the anti-Japan revolutionary tradition as the ideological contents of the movement or more significantly as the spiritual base of the army. Such a trend was seen most apparently in the decision made in 1978 to change the date of the Korean People's Army Establishment Memorial Day from February 8 to April 25. The reason of the change, it was claimed, was that although the Korean People's Army was established in 1948, it was when the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung established the Korean People's Revolutionary Army that the people came to possess their own real revolutionary power and that the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung established the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 25, 1932.<sup>42</sup>

The emphasis on the anti-Japan revolutionary tradition, as stated above, played an important role in strengthening Kim Jong Il's leadership, especially in the division of military affairs. That is, such an emphasis is thought not only to have stabilized the support for Kim Jong Il among the participants of the anti-Japan combat who occupied the majority of army leaders but also to have expanded the support for him among the children of the participants of the anti-Japan combat, so-called "the children of the revolution heroes," many of whom are thought to have been in the middle stratum of the army.

Kim Jong Il started a new mass movement which involved army leaders in the end of 1979 when the Sixth Assembly of the Korean Labor Party decided to open the following year. It was the movement to follow and learn from Comrade Oh Jung Heum who served Kim Il Sung during the anti-Japan combat and died in battle that Kim Jong Il authorized. He instructed the Party's organization and the political organ to understand this movement as the Party's activity and promote it powerfully.<sup>43</sup> There were numerous articles in the party and military papers endorsing the strengthening of the movement and of *Juche*. Judging from the context, it is obvious that in each of these articles the term "the Party," frequently referred to, was used as a synonym for "the Party's Center." Furthermore, the *Rodong sinmun* of April 25 carried an article titled, "Visiting the Army Unit of Comrade Lee Ju O Who Acquired the Red Flag of the Three Great Revolutions," reporting that the unit started its recreation meeting with the chorus of the song, "Let's Desperately Defend the Great Leader and the Party's Center with Our Lives!" In this period, the movement in the bottom stratum of the army to

give authority to Kim Jong Il is thought to have been promoted far more than the military leaders' careful expressions about the movement in the public documents.

The characteristics of the movement for the establishment of Kim Jong Il's leadership over the army during the 1970s were: (a) The movement came to surface around 1974 using the Party's organization, the division of ideology, and that of culture and arts in which Kim Jong Il had already established his leadership; (b) it was developed by using as a leverage the mass movement centering around the political organ in the army; (c) it was promoted by receiving the positive support from the anti-Japan combat participants; and (d) Kim Il Sung exerted positive influence in the important events which marked the stages of Kim Jong Il's leadership formation in the army.

Kim Jong Il was elected a member of the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee at the Sixth General Assembly in October 1980. It may be too obvious to indicate that during the following decade until May 1990, when he was elected the First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee at the Ninth Term of the First Assembly of the Supreme People's Council, Kim Jong Il developed his activities to establish his leadership in the division of military affairs more clearly and powerfully than during the 1970s.

### Use and Present Condition of Kim Jong Il's Leadership

I would like to briefly refer to the achievements in Kim Jong Il's leadership over the military units. During the 1970s, such action was not known outside of the military at all. This, however, does not mean that Kim Jong Il was not active during this period. In 1980, Kim Jong Il's visits to and leadership in the military units during the 1960s and 1970s were gradually introduced by the articles about the events on the Anniversary of the Establishment of the Army including the Artillery Anniversary on June 20, the Air Forces Anniversary on August 20, and Navy Anniversary on August 23. Of course, these are nothing more than the tip of an iceberg. Contrary to the propagandist attitude concerning the matters in the other divisions, North Korea, at least until today, has not always been positive in publicly announcing the relationship between Kim Jong Il and the division of military affairs.

By 1992, Kim Jong Il assumed the position of Chairman of the National Defense Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the entire military. Although the accurate status of the National Defense Committee in the constitution is not clear, there is no doubt that, judging from the lineup of its members including Chairman Kim Il Sung as its Chairman, and Defense Minister O Jin U and the Chief of General Staff Koi Jurang as its Vice Chairmen, the committee is the *de facto* top authority over all the military



organizations. We may safely conclude that Kim Jong Il, has effectively succeeded the position of the top leader over all the military organizations in North Korea including the Korean People's Army which is the regular army, the People's Guards which is under the department of social safety, and the Soviet Red Army which is the militia organization. The total personnel of the organizations is estimated to amount to 5 million, which is tantamount to a quarter of North Korea's total population.

We may be able to say that today Kim Jong Il's leadership over the division of military affairs is firmly established through not only his institutionalized position but also his human relations with the executive members of the military, and the establishment of his authority in the military.

### CONCLUSION: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF KIM JONG IL'S POWER BASE AND ITS STABILITY

Based on this study of Kim Jong Il's power base, we may be able to indicate the following points as the characteristics in the process of its formation. The first characteristic is that the range of Kim Jong Il's leadership has expanded from the division of campaign to that of economic affairs and eventually to that of military affairs. It is important to note here, however, that the direction of the expansion of his leadership was not genuinely one-way but that it was synergistic, that is, the formation of leadership in each division has helped each other.

The second characteristic is that the three activities, that is acquiring the institutional authority and position which are the source of his leadership, arranging organizations to support the leadership by establishing necessary organizations, and initiating and leading various movements, have among them strengthened and established Kim Jong Il's leadership. It should be noted here, however, that the mass movement developed by him was not the one voluntarily started among the masses but the one which mobilized the masses.

The third is that Kim Il Sung, himself, played important roles in the significant events which could promote Kim Jong Il's leadership to a higher level. In addition, there were notable activities by Kim Il Sung's comrades-in-arms in the anti-Japan combat. The fourth characteristic, which is inversely related to the third one, is that the establishment of the absolute authority of Kim Il Sung and the emphasis on the anti-Japan revolutionary tradition were promoted in connection with the expansion of Kim Jong Il's leadership.

Next, I would like to point out a structural characteristic of Kim Jong Il's power base formed in the above mentioned manner. If expressed in a word, it means that Kim Jong Il's power base holds a "comprehensive" character in various ways. First of all, Kim Jong Il's power base, in view of its

organization and structure, not only horizontally includes all the three divisions that support the three elements of the power, that is, those of ideology, economic affairs, and military affairs, but also vertically includes the bottom stratum to the top stratum in each of these divisions. As a result of that, a majority of North Korean people are controlled and mobilized inescapably by the meshes of the net of Kim Jong Il's power base. Also in view of personnel affairs, Kim Jong Il's power base horizontally involves alumni of each division from artists to scientists, the Party's executive members, and the members of the army and vertically comprehends three generations, that is, the seniors (the generation of the anti-Japan combat), the juniors (the generation of the leaders of the Three Great Revolutions teams), and the youths (the generation of students participating in the Three Great Revolutions teams).

As a conclusion of this study, I may be able to evaluate Kim Jong Il's power base as a stable one in the sense that it is hard to imagine "any opposition group" among the existent political powers in North Korea. Of course this conclusion does not completely exclude a possibility that some particular people or groups opposing Kim Jong Il may exist in North Korea. What this means is that even if there exists some anti-Kim Jong Il group in North Korea, such a group may not have any common political and social base in the existent institutions. Such a baseless group tends to be limited in its capability of increasing its members and in carrying out a long-lasting movement. After all, such a group is hardly expected to become capable of effectively confronting the comprehensive power base held by Kim Jong Il, defeating it, and forming an alternative political order to replace it.

However, saying that one can hardly imagine any opposition power to Kim Jong Il's power base and that the possibility of Kim Jong Il's losing his position to someone else in the country is low does not necessarily guarantee that Kim Jong Il's regime will stay as firm as a rock in the future. We might say that the worst crisis which Kim Jong Il's regime will face or has already faced, if any, could be the one not from the outside but from the inside. Such a crisis may be caused by competition among the divisions over loyalty toward Kim Jong Il, the spread of bureaucratism or nihilism, or the lack of objective evaluations of or function to reform policies already adopted. A scenario that, in the event of aggravation of such organizational problems common in any authoritarian political regime, Kim Jong Il's regime would actually stop functioning should be considered valid despite the stability of his power base.

### NOTES

1. E.H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*.
2. Alvin Toffler, *Power Shift*.
3. Masao Onogi, "Ideology and Political Leadership of Kim Jong Il," in *North Korea at the Crossroads* (in Japanese).

4. As an example, one may cite *Bukhan chongram* (Seoul, 1983) in which the nature of the Three Revolutions and Small Teams is described.
5. See *The Star of Leadership in the Self-Reliance Era* (in Japanese). Published and distributed by the Central Committee of *Chosun Soren*, Volume 2, pp. 161-162.
6. In Su Choi, *People's Leader Secretary Kim Jong Il* (in Japanese). Volume 2, pp. 63-64.
7. *Chosun Jonsa* (Complete History of Korea; in Korean). Pyongyang, The People's Press of Korea, Volume 31, pp. 32-34.
8. *The Great Victory for Juche Ideology* (in Japanese), p. 205.
9. *Chosun Jonsa*. Volume 31, pp. 34-35.
10. In Su Choi, op. cit., p. 41.
11. *Chosun Jonsa* states that "this construction is a central concern of the Party." See Volume 31, p. 35.
12. *Rodong sinmun*, June 5, 1967.
13. Shuhachi Inoue, *Contemporary North Korea and Secretary Kim Jong Il* (in Japanese), p. 163.
14. *Chosun Jonsa*, Volume 31, p. 36.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *The Star of Leadership in the Self-Reliance Era*, pp. 275-284.
17. In Su Choi, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Encyclopedia* (in Japanese), Volume 2, p. 647.
20. In Su Choi, op. cit., p. 73.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-78.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
24. *Chosun Jonsa*. Volume 31, pp. 272-273.
25. In Su Choi, op. cit., pp. 87-93.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
28. Shuhachi Inoue, op. cit., 118.
29. Masashi Ishikawa, *Kim Jong Il: Personality and Achievements* (in Japanese), p. 82.
30. Shuhachi Inoue, op. cit., 153.
31. *Chosun Jonsa*, Volume 32, p. 206.
32. *Chosun Jungang Yon Kam* (in Korean; Central Yearbook of Korea, Pyongyang), 1975, p. 283.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 283-286.
34. *Chosun Jonsa*, Volume 32, pp. 195-196.
35. *Rodong sinmun* reported a case of this educational method as practiced in a collective farm. See its August 10, 1974 issue.
36. The First occurred on March 10-13, 1975 and the Second on March 27-April 1, 1976.
37. *Chosun Jonsa*, Volume 32, pp. 202-205.
38. *Rodong sinmun*, October 13, 1973.
39. *Rodong sinmun*, April 25, 1974.
40. The magazine reported that "Let us further reinforce our invincible revolutionary power by perfecting the self-reliance policy line."
41. He stated further that "Our party is a revolutionary party guided by the great *Juche* ideology."
42. *Rodong sinmun* carried an editorial titled "Our Party's Glorious Revolutionary Military Power and the Korean People's Army," on February 8, 1978.
43. *Ibid.*

## 8

# POLITICS AND STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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